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/**** ****** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE **********/
BODY
TAGS: SNAR, BL
SUBJECT: THE TIME IS RIGHT - OUR INITIATIVE TO TRANSFER NARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS TO THE GOB AND FORMATION OF AN "ALL SOURCE" JOINT NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE FUSION CENTER

1. SUMMARY: IN DECEMBER 1992, DEA LA PAZ IN CONJUNCTION WITH NAS, OTHER MISSION INTELLIGENCE ELEMENTS, THE DCM AND THE AMBASSADOR BEGAN A BOLD INITIATIVE AIMED AT TRULY BEGINNING TO TURN OVER THE COUNTERNARCOTICS "WAR" IN BOLIVIA TO GOB COUNTERNARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT ENTITIES. THESE ENTITIES HAVE IMPROVED THEIR EFFICIENCY AND PROFESSIONALISM TO THE POINT WHERE DEA LA PAZ AND THE MISSION BELIEVE THAT THE TIME IS "RIGHT" TO BEGIN THIS NEW PHASE OF COUNTERNARCOTICS ACTIVITY IN BOLIVIA. THE MISSION OPG AND DEA INTELLIGENCE HAVE DEVELOPED A PLAN IN CONJUNCTION WITH TRUSTED COUNTERNARCOTICS OFFICIALS TO IMPLEMENT THE FOLLOWING:

1. RESTRUCTURE FELCN (SPECIAL FORCES FOR THE FIGHT AGAINST NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING), REPLACING SELECTED PERSONNEL FROM THE TOP TO THE BOTTOM

2. REDUCE THE SIZE OF THE COUNTERNARCOTICS POLICE AND FELCN STAFF IN TARGETED LOCATIONS AS MUCH AS 50%

3. INCREASE THE CAPABILITIES OF THE PRECURSOR CONTROL GROUP

4. SLIGHTLY INCREASE THE SIZE OF THE UMOPAR

5. CREATE AN "ALL SOURCE" JOINT NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE FUSION CENTER WITHIN FELCN.

THE ULTIMATE GOAL IS TO END UP WITH A "LEANER AND MEANER" COUNTERNARCOTICS FORCE UNDER THE DIRECT CONTROL OF A COMPETENT, TRUSTED FELCN HQS (A FIRST EVER IN BOLIVIA). U.S. ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL AT THE HQS AND FIELD LEVELS ARE STILL NEEDED, BUT IT IS TIME TO MOVE TOWARD AN INCREASED ADVISORY AND OVERSIGHT ROLE WITH REDUCED DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN ACTUAL OPERATIONS. IN KEEPING WITH THIS, THE LA PAZ C.O. AND THE MISSION WILL REQUIRE LESS TDY LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL BEGINNING IN APRIL, 1993.

SPECIFIC PLANS FOR THE JOINT NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE FUSION CENTER AND TDY MANPOWER REDUCTION RECOMMENDATIONS WILL BE FORWARDED WITHIN THE WEEK.
END SUMMARY.
2. INSTITUTION BUILDING: WE HAVE COME A LONG WAY ON THE ENFORCEMENT SIDE SINCE THE FORMATION OF FELCN IN 1986 AND THE SUBSEQUENT FORMATION AND GROWTH OF ITS SUBORDINATE UNITS SUCH AS THE UMOPAR, NARCOTICS POLICE, RED DEVILS, BLUE DEVILS AND THE RECENTLY FORMED PRECURSOR CONTROL GROUP (OCIAQ). THEIR OPERATIONAL AND INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION CAPABILITIES HAVE DRAMATICALLY MATURED DURING THESE FIRST TWO YEARS OF THE LAST DECADE OF THIS CENTURY. WE HAVE REACHED THE CROSSROADS. IT IS TIME TO BEGIN THE TRANSFER OF RESPONSIBILITY AND MANAGEMENT FOR THE COUNTERNARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT TO THE GOB THROUGH A SYSTEMATIC AND MANAGED PROGRAM THAT WILL ENSURE THE CONTINUATION OF OUR VERY SUCCESSFUL ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS. WORDS AND SPEECHES ALONE CANNOT PROVIDE A SOLID FOUNDATION FOR TRANSFERRING RESPONSIBILITY FOR COUNTERNARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS FROM THE U.S. INTO THE HANDS OF THE BOLIVIANS. SOUND, CREATIVE PROGRAMMING, COUPLED WITH CLEAR ACCOUNTABILITY AND FOCUSED, CONSISTENT

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 ******/
MONITORING, CAN PROVIDE THAT FOUNDATION. THIS NEW INITIATIVE IS A CY 93 GOAL OF BOTH THE LA PAZ COUNTRY OFFICE AND THE MISSION.

3. RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: IN AN ERA OF DWINDLING DOLLARS, THE FUNDING OF SEPARATE ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PROGRAMS - BOTH WITHIN THE BOLIVIAN COUNTERNARCOTICS AGENCIES AND WITHIN THE U.S. MISSION ELEMENTS - CAN NO LONGER BE CONTINUED. MERGING AND CENTRALIZING DUPLICATIVE ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS, COMPUTERIZING ALL CONDUCIVE DATABASES, AND ACTIVELY "MANAGING" NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, ANALYSIS, AND DISSEMINATION AS WELL AS ASSUMING A TRUE ADVISORY AND OVERSIGHT ROLE WITH ENFORCEMENT MATTERS, WILL RESULT IN A GREATER BANG FOR OUR COLLECTIVE DOLLARS.

4. BACKGROUND: IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DEA KINGPIN STRATEGY AND LINEAR APPROACH, THE MAJORITY OF BOLIVIAN/DEA ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION EFFORTS ARE TARGETED AGAINST COLOMBIAN CARTEL OPERATIONS IN BOLIVIA AND CARTEL-CONTROLLED BOLIVIAN TRAFFICKING GROUPS. THE EXPANSION AND NEW DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PROGRAMS OVER THE COURSE OF THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS HAS FUELED LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTION AGAINST THESE GROUPS, FORCING MANY GROUPS TO REORGANIZE AND MOVE OPERATIONS TO AVOID DETECTION.
THE CURRENT STAGE HAS BEEN SET BY THE RESULTS OF THREE

MAJOR OPERATIONS AND THE RESULTING INTELLIGENCE USED TO LAY THE FOUNDATION FOR EACH SUCCESSIVE OPERATION. IN OCTOBER 1990, OPERATION ANTIPANANI (THE MECO DOMINGUEZ CASE), WAS THE FIRST OPERATION TO TARGET AN ENTIRE BOLIVIAN TRAFFICKING GROUP, AND RESULTED IN THE ARREST AND SUCCESSFUL PROSECUTION OF NETWORK MEMBERS, AS WELL AS THE SEIZURES OF OPERATIONAL LABS, AIRCRAFT, AND COMMERCIAL/RESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES. DETAILED INFORMATION FROM THIS CASE PROVIDED VALUABLE INSIGHT INTO THE HIERARCHY OF BOLIVIAN DRUG TRAFFICKING, AND WAS THE CORNERSTONE IN TARGETING BOLIVIA'S TOP TRAFFICKERS WHO CONTROLLED THE TOWN OF SANTA ANA. DURING THIS OPERATION, SELECTED BOLIVIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS, FOR THE FIRST TIME, ASSISTED IN THE PLANNING.

OPERATION SAFEHAVEN IN JUNE 1991, TARGETED SANTA ANA, THE REFUGE OF BOLIVIA'S DRUG HIERARCHY. THIS OPERATION RESULTED IN THE ARREST AND/OR SURRENDER OF THE UPPER ECHELON OF BOLIVIAN TRAFFICKERS, AND THE SEIZURE OF 46 AIRCRAFT AND MULTIPLE OTHER ASSETS AND DOCUMENTS. FROM THIS OPERATION, ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS INDICATED THE LEVEL OF COLOMBIAN INFLUENCE IN BOLIVIA WAS INCREASING AT AN ALARMING RATE. BOLIVIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT COUNTERPARTS PLAYED A MUCH GREATER ROLE IN PLANNING AND EXECUTING THIS OPERATION AND BECAME INVOLVED FROM DAY ONE. THEY DISPLAYED A VERY HIGH LEVEL OF PROFESSIONALISM AND DISCIPLINE.

OPERATION GHOST ZONE, BEGUN IN JANUARY 1992, WAS DESIGNED TO SEVER TRANSPORTATION ROUTES OUT OF THE CHAPARE, THUS CUTTING OFF COLOMBIAN CARTELS FROM SOURCES OF BASE COCAINE. IT HAS RESULTED IN FORCING THE COLOMBIAN CARTELS TO CHANGE THEIR METHODS OF OPERATIONS, SPENDING ENORMOUS SUMS OFMONEY SEEKING ALTERNATIVE TRANSPORTATION

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 ******/
METHODS OUT OF THE CHAPARE, AGAIN INCREASING THEIR VISIBILITY. OUR BOLIVIAN COUNTERPARTS AGAIN PLANNED THE OPERATION WITH DEA AND THEIR IDEAS AND SUGGESTIONS RESULTED IN A MUCH MORE COMPREHENSIVE AND SUCCESSFUL OPERATION.

THE CULMINATION OF THESE OPERATIONAL SUCCESSES OVER A TWO YEAR PERIOD HAS BEEN THE ARREST OF TWO MAJOR CARTEL KINGPIN SOURCES IN BOLIVIA - CELIMO ANDRADE-QUINTERO OF THE CALI CARTEL AND LUIS JAIRO ZAPATA-ZAPATA OF THE MEDELLIN CARTEL. THE DEBRIEFINGS AND DOCUMENT ANALYSIS OF THESE MAJOR CARTEL CONNECTIONS AND THEIR UNDERLINGS HAVE IMPACTED ON THE GROWING WEALTH OF INTELLIGENCE COLLECTED BY THE JOINT NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE COORDINATION CENTER (JNICC) AND DEA BY PROVIDING

ADDITIONAL INSIGHT INTO THE INFRASTRUCTURE OF COLOMBIAN CARTELS AND THEIR INFLUENCE OVER BOLIVIAN TRAFFICKING GROUPS, AS WELL AS SPECIFIC INVESTIGATIVE LEADS.

WITH EACH SUCCESSFUL OPERATION HAS COME AN AVALANCHE OF NEW INTELLIGENCE AND ACTIONABLE ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION AND A CONCOMMITANT INCREASE IN NEW SOURCES TO DEBRIEF AND TASK FOR FURTHER COLLECTION. THESE ESCALATING SOURCES OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE, COUPLED WITH GROWING RETURNS FROM EXPANDED COLLECTION PROGRAMS IN SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE, IMAGERY, DOCUMENT EXPLOITATION, SPECIAL ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS, AND SPECIFIC DATABASES, NOW REQUIRE THE INSTITUTION OF AN OVERALL SYSTEM OF MANAGING THE INFORMATION AND THE ABILITY TO ACT QUICKLY AND PROFESSIONALLY ON THE ENFORCEMENT SIDE. THE TOTAL INTEGRATION OF BOLIVIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL INTO THE COUNTERNARCOTICS PROGRAM THROUGH A RESTRUCTURED FELCN WITH A NEW JOINT NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE FUSION CENTER IS NOW ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL.

THIS REQUIREMENT FOR A SINGLE, MANAGED ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE WITH U.S. OVERSIGHT IS BORN OF OPERATIONAL NECESSITY. MASSIVE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS DURING THE LAST TWO YEARS HAVE PUSHED MAJOR TRAFFICKING GROUPS INTO CURRENT DEFENSIVE POSTURES. DRUG TRAFFICKERS ARE MOST VULNERABLE WHEN THEY ARE MOST VISIBLE, AND THEY ARE MOST VISIBLE WHEN FORCED TO REORGANIZE FOLLOWING SUCCESSFUL LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTION. WE ARE AT A CRITICAL JUNCTURE IN BOLIVIA. CONTINUED, UNRELENTING ENFORCEMENT ACTION WILL PREVENT CURRENT MAJOR TRAFFICKERS FROM ENTRENCHMENT. THEIR CONSTANT DEFENSIVE MOVEMENT WILL CONTINUE TO DRAIN THEIR RESOURCES, AND RENDER THEM VULNERABLE AT THEIR WEAKEST POINTS, I.E. CASH FLOW, ACCESS TO CHEMICALS/MATERIALS, COMMUNICATIONS, AND TRANSPORTATION. THE UNIFIED MARSHALLING OF INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES IN SUPPORT OF A STRONG AND CONTINUOUS OPERATIONAL OFFENSIVE IS OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE.
5. RESTRUCTURE PLAN: IN DECEMBER, A WORKING LUNCHEON WAS HOSTED. IN ATTENDANCE WERE ALL KEY COUNTERNARCOTICS PLAYERS FROM FELCN, UMOPAR, AND JNICC. SUBSECRETARY OF SOCIAL DEFENSE GONZALO TORRICO WAS TRAVELLING BUT SENT HIS ASSISTANT TO REPRESENT HIM. EMBASSY ELEMENTS INCLUDED NAS, THE MISSION OPG, AND DEA.

DURING THE FIVE HOUR WORK SESSION, COL. ROGELIO VARGAS,

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 004 ******/
THE CURRENT CHIMORE UMOPAR COMMANDER, WAS SELECTED TO BECOME THE SUBCOMMANDER AT FELCN, SECOND ONLY TO COMMANDING GENERAL EDWIN PAREDO (RETIRED BOLIVIAN

ARMY). THE MISSION CONSIDERED COL. VARGAS' SELECTION AS CRITICAL TO THE PLANNED RESTRUCTURING EFFORT. SUBSECRETARY TORRICO HAD PREVIOUSLY AGREED TO THIS APPOINTMENT DURING A MEETING WITH A/CA AUFLICK. THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY SELECTION OF ALL UMOPAR AND NARCOTICS POLICE COMMANDERS AT MAJOR LOCATIONS. FOR THE FIRST TIME, THE U.S. PERSONNEL WERE ABLE TO "SIT ON THE SIDELINES" AND WATCH THE GOB ATTENDEES SCREEN AND SELECT HONEST, DEDICATED ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS. CRITICAL STAFF POSITIONS AT FELCN HQS WERE NOT SELECTED. COL. VARGAS, A LOYAL AND TRUSTED PARTNER, WILL COORDINATE THESE SELECTIONS UPON ARRIVAL AT FELCN HQS.

ALL ATTENDEES AGREED TO A RESTRUCTURING PLAN WHICH WILL RESULT IN A "HOUSE CLEANING SESSION" THROUGH WHICH ALL DISHONEST AND/OR NON-PRODUCTIVE PERSONNEL WILL BE ELIMINATED FROM FELCN, THE SPECIAL FORCE. UNNECESSARY POSITIONS, I.E. STAFF DEAD WEIGHT, WILL LIKEWISE BE ELIMINATED. IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT SOME UNITS SUCH AS THE COCHABAMBA NARCOTICS POLICE WILL BE REDUCED BY MORE THAN 50 PERCENT.

GOOD BOY/BAD BOY LISTS ARE BEING PREPARED AND STAFFED WITHIN THE GOB AND DEA FOR ACCURACY. THE GOB SYSTEM MOVES SLOWLY BUT IT DOES MOVE. WE ARE OPTIMISTIC THAT THE AGREED UPON SELECTIONS WILL BE APPOINTED DURING THE FIRST WEEK IN FEBRUARY. MINISTER OF INTERIOR CARLOS SAAVEDRA BRUNO AND SUBSECRETARY TORRICO HAVE BOTH EXPRESSED THEIR CONCURRENCE WITH THE SELECTIONS AND THEIR CONFIDENCE IN THE RESTRUCTURING PLAN WHICH INCLUDES A MUCH MORE ACTIVE ADVISORY ROLE FOR DEA WITH THE COUNTERNARCOTICS POLICE AND WITH THE ARRIVAL OF COL. VARGAS, A VERY CLOSE WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH FELCN. AGAIN, FOR THE FIRST TIME, U.S. ENTITIES WILL BEGIN TO PASS THE TORCH TO FELCN THROUGH COL. VARGAS. AS THE SENIOR POLICE AND UMOPAR OFFICIAL IN FELCN, HE WILL ACTUALLY "TAKE CHARGE" OF A HAND PICKED STAFF AND ALL FIELD NARCOTICS FORCES. COL. VARGAS, AS WELL AS MINISTER SAAVEDRA AND SUBSECRETARY TORRICO, ARE AWARE OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE ACTIONS AND ARE VERY EXCITED ABOUT THE FORMATION OF A TRULY EFFECTIVE SPECIAL FORCE AS WELL AS THE FORMATION OF THE NEW JOINT NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE FUSION CENTER WHICH WILL FOCUS AND DRIVE ALL FUTURE OPERATIONS.

6. JOINT NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE FUSION CENTER: AS PART OF THE REORGANIZATION, THE JNICC COMPONENT WAS REVIEWED FOR PURPOSES OF DEVELOPING A CLOSER WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH DEA INTELLIGENCE. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE CURRENT NEED TO CONSOLIDATE INFORMATION

PROCESSES INTO "FUSION CENTER" CONCEPTS, THE LA PAZ COUNTRY OFFICE IN COORDINATION WITH FELCN OFFICIALS HAS DESIGNED A JOINT NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE FUSION CENTER WHICH HAS AS ITS FOCAL POINT THE INCREMENTAL BUILDING OF A BOLIVIAN-MANAGED NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM. THIS NEW INITIATIVE PARALLELS THE MANDATE OF THE ANDEAN STRATEGY TO BUILD HOST-NATION INSTITUTIONS CAPABLE OF

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 005 ******/
ASSUMING RESPONSIBILITY FOR COUNTERNARCOTICS ACTIVITIES.

THE JOINT NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE FUSION CENTER IS VIEWED NOT AS A JICC (JOINT INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION CENTER) WHERE PRIMARY EMPHASIS IS ON COLLECTION OF TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE; RATHER, THE FUSION CENTER WILL HAVE AN EXPANDED ROLE - THAT OF MANAGING, ANALYZING, AND DISSEMINATING ALL-SOURCE BOLIVIAN DRUG INTELLIGENCE. WITH JNICC AND OTHER BOLIVIAN AGENCIES WORKING IN SUPPORT OF THE KINGPIN/LINEAR STRATEGY, THERE WILL BE A FOCUSED COURSE OF ACTION FROM INTELLIGENCE TO ENFORCEMENT AND UP THROUGH THE PROSECUTION/ADJUDICATION PROCESSES.

THIS COHESIVE APPROACH TO NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE AND ENFORCEMENT FUNCTIONS WILL BE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE JOINT NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE FUSION CENTER. DRAWING ON A WIDE RANGE OF BOLIVIAN, DEA, AND INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES, THE JOINT NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE CENTER WILL EXPEDITE INFORMATION INITIALLY THROUGH THE MISSION OPERATIONAL PLANNING GROUP (OPG) TO AN ESTABLISHED AMALGAM OF ENFORCEMENT TEAMS INCLUDING THE PRECURSOR INTERDICTION GROUP, COMBINED UMOPAR/SNOWCAP TEAMS, OPERATION SCREAMING EAGLE TEAMS, UNDERCOVER AGENTS AND INFORMANTS, NARCOTICS POLICE, AND SPECIALIZED SURGICAL STRIKE FORCES - ALL FOCUSED ON THE PENETRATION, IMMOBILIZATION, AND DISMANTLING OF TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS OPERATING IN BOLIVIA.

THEIR COMBINED SUCCESSES - ARREST AND SEIZURES AS PLANNED, WILL MOVE QUICKLY AND PROFESSIONALLY THROUGH THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE BY WAY OF ACCOUNTABILITY PROGRAMS DIRECTLY LINKED VIA COMPUTER TO INTELLIGENCE AND ENFORCEMENT ELEMENTS. THIS LINKAGE OF INTELLIGENCE, ENFORCEMENT, AND PROSECUTION WILL CLOSE THE GAPS WHICH TRAFFICKERS HAVE LONG DEPENDED UPON FOR EVASION OF JAIL TIME AND PROFIT LOSS.

THE PROGRAM IS A TWO-YEAR INITIATIVE WHICH WILL INITIALLY FOCUS ON TRAINING BOLIVIAN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS IN ALL FACETS OF THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS,

UPGRADING PERSONNEL SECURITY THROUGH THE USE OF POLYGRAPHS AND OTHER MEASURES, METHODICALLY TRANSFERRING DATABASES TO THE NEW FUSION CENTER, AND ESTABLISHING WITHIN THE RANKS OF BOLIVIAN ANALYSTS TWO WORKING GROUPS.

THE FIRST GROUP WILL BE THE COLLECTION MANAGEMENT GROUP, WHOSE FUNCTION WILL BE TO CONTROL THE INTAKE, MAINTENANCE, AND DISSEMINATION OF NARCOTICS INFORMATION FROM THE FUSION CENTER. THEY WILL TASK COUNTERNARCOTICS GROUPS FOR FURTHER COLLECTION, AND WILL TRACK BOTH TASKING REQUESTS AND REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION FROM OUTSIDE THE CENTER.

THE SECOND GROUP WILL BE COMPOSED OF 6 TEAMS OF 3 ANALYSTS EACH. THESE CLUSTER WORKING GROUPS WILL BE ASSIGNED SPECIFIC TARGETS (TRAFFICKER, INFRASTRUCTURE, AND GEOGRAPHIC) EMANATING FROM THE LAST TARGETING CONFERENCE. THEY WILL DEVELOP AND MAINTAIN AUTOMATED

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 006 ******/
TARGET FOLDERS ON EACH OF THEIR DESIGNATED TARGETS. THEY WILL BE TASKED WITH EXPLOITING DOCUMENTS FROM THEIR RESPECTIVE TARGETS, AND WITH CONTINUOUSLY RESEARCHING PUBLIC RECORDS RELATED TO THEIR ASSIGNMENTS. THE GROUPS WILL PREPARE WRITTEN PRODUCTS, BOTH OPERATIONAL AND STRATEGIC, BASED ON RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS.
THE CLUSTER WORKING GROUPS WILL RELY NOT ONLY ON ESTABLISHED INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS, BUT WILL DRAW ON A NETWORK OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS AND SOURCES OF INFORMATION MANAGED BY THE JNICC. IN-DEPTH DEBRIEFINGS OF INFORMANTS AND SOURCES OF INFORMATION BY THE WORKING GROUP WILL BE A CORNERSTONE OF FUSION CENTER ACTIVITY, AND WILL BE REGULARLY PERFORMED IN COORDINATION WITH BOLIVIAN AND DEA ENFORCEMENT GROUPS. THE WORKING GROUPS WILL WORK IN DAILY COORDINATION WITH THEIR INTELLIGENCE COUNTERPARTS, BOTH BOLIVIAN AND DEA, IN LA PAZ, COCHABAMBA, AND SANTA CRUZ.

THE ISSUE OF DEALING WITH SENSITIVE INFORMATION IS CLEARLY AT THE FOREFRONT. IN ADDITION TO CLOSE MONITORING OF SECURITY UPGRADING NOTED ABOVE, PLANS CALL FOR USING INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM SENSITIVE-SOURCE PROGRAMS BY CODING THE SOURCE AND CLOSELY REVIEWING INFORMATION TO BE RELEASED TO REMOVE ANY INDICATION OF SOURCE. ULTRA-SENSITIVE INFORMATION, REGARDLESS OF SOURCE (CORRUPTION DATABASES), WILL REMAIN UNDER THE MANAGEMENT OF DEA INTELLIGENCE DURING, AT A MINIMUM, THE FIRST YEAR.

INITIAL MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT OF THE JOINT NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE FUSION CENTER WILL BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF TWO FULL-TIME DEA COORDINATORS, ONE ENFORCEMENT AGENT AND ONE INTELLIGENCE AGENT. THE COLLECTION MANAGEMENT GROUP WITH THE CLUSTER WORKING GROUPS TOTAL APPROXIMATELY 28 PERSONNEL.

ANOTHER IMPORTANT SEGMENT OF THE JOINT NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE FUSION CENTER WILL BE A 32 MAN-SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE AND ENFORCEMENT UNIT AS PART OF JNICC. THIS UNIT WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE COLLECTION (I.E. COVERT SURVEILLANCES) AND ULTIMATE ENFORCEMENT ACTION ON SPECIALLY SELECTED TARGETS SUCH AS HIGH RANKING POLITICAL FIGURES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. THEY WILL FEED ALL RAW DATA AND INTELLIGENCE INTO THE FUSION CENTER'S COLLECTION MANAGEMENT GROUP. THE ABOVE MENTIONED ENFORCEMENT AGENT HAS THE ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR OVERSIGHT OF THIS UNIT.

APPROPRIATE CHARTS AND WORK PLANS HAS BEEN PREPARED AND WILL BE FORWARDED SEPARATELY.
7. OFFICE OF CONTROL, INVESTIGATIONS OF CHEMICAL ACTION (OCIAQ): THIS SPECIALLY FORMED PRECURSOR CONTROL UNIT (OCIAQ) IS ANOTHER RECENT INITIATIVE AND ADDITION TO FELCN. DEA LA PAZ HAS ASSIGNED ONE FULL TIME SPECIAL AGENT TO THIS UNIT TO PROVIDE OVERSIGHT AND DIRECTION. AS A RESULT OF THIS AND FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR TRAINING SEMINARS, VEHICLES, OFFICE SPACE, TELEPHONE LINES, AND FIELD EQUIPMENT PROVIDED BY DEA AND NAS, THE OCIAQ ACTIVITIES HAVE EXTENDED BEYOND LA PAZ TO AREAS SUCH AS SANTA CRUZ, CHAPARE, YUNGAS AND MOST IMPORTANT, THE

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 007 ******/
CHILEAN BORDER.

THE MOST RECENT SEIZURE OF PRECURSORS BY OCIAQ WAS SIGNIFICANT IN THAT IT TOUCHED RELATIVES OF MINISTER-LEVEL OFFICIALS AND HAS LED TO AN ON-GOING JOINT CHILEAN-BOLIVIAN INVESTIGATION AT UNPRECEDENTED LEVELS OF COOPERATION FROM ALL THE CHILEAN AGENCIES. IT APPEARS THAT RECENT MEETINGS IN CHILE BETWEEN DEA, OCIAQ, AND CHILEAN ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS WILL RESULT IN INCREASED PRECURSOR INTERDICTION ACTIVITY AND COOPERATION.

8. EXPECTED REDUCTION OF TDY ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL: IN CONJUNCTION WITH THIS INITIATIVE, A REDUCTION OF TDY NFORCEMENT PERSONNEL IS ANTICIPATED FOR APRIL. THE LA PAZ C.O. IS CURRENTLY PREPARING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THIS REDUCTION. AGAIN, THE TIME IS RIGHT. OUR LAW ENFORCEMENT COUNTERPARTS AREBETTER TRAINED, PREPARED AND EQUIPPED TO "LEAD THE CHARGE" WHILE IN-COUNTRY AND

SNOWCAP PERSONNEL WILL TRULY FUNCTION IN AN ADVISORY AND OVERSIGHT ROLE. THIS WILL RESULT IN LESS DIRECT PARTICIPATION BY U.S. ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL IN OPERATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAST PROGRAM REVIEW OF SNOWCAP RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

COMMENT: THIS COMPREHENSIVE INITIATIVE IS THE NEXT LOGICAL EVOLUTIONARY STEP FOR THE BOLIVIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE APPROPRIATE TRANSITION FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT ENFORCEMENT SUPPORT IN BOLIVIA IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ANDEAN STRATEGY. SINCE THE CREATION OF FELCN, WE HAVE OBSERVED A FLEDGLING INSTITUTION DEVELOP INTO A DYNAMIC AND SUCCESSFUL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY THAT IS CAPABLE AND READY TO MOVE EFFICIENTLY TO THE NEXT PHASE OF A SUCCESSFUL BOLIVIAN/U.S BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. WE ARE NOT SO NAIVE AS TO ASSUME THAT THIS AGGRESSIVE PROGRAM CAN BE MOUNTED OVERNIGHT AND WITHOUT TRADITIONAL SETBACKS OR STUMBLING BLOCKS. HOWEVER, THE BOLIVIAN ENFORCEMENT ENTITIES ARE CLEARLY READY, WILLING, AND ABLE AND APPROPRIATE GOB OFFICIALS SUPPORT THIS PROGRESSION. IT IS CRITICAL AND ESSENTIAL THAT THIS STRUCTURE BE IMPLEMENTED AND OPERATIONAL BEFORE THE CHANGE OF BOLIVIAN GOVERNMENT IN AUGUST, 1993. WITH THIS IN MIND, WE INTEND TO MOVE RAPIDLY TO IMPLEMENT THESE INITIATIVES AS WE STRIVE TO ASSIST THE BOLIVIANS IN GAINING FULL SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN COUNTER-DRUG OPERATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE.

BOWERS
ADMIN
BT

#5012

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